

# CLIMATE AMBITION BEYOND EMISSION NUMBERS

**Taking stock of progress by looking inside  
countries and sectors**

EUROPE

*Phuc-Vinh NGUYEN, Jean-Arnold VINOIS*

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# CLIMATE AMBITION BEYOND EMISSION NUMBERS

## Taking stock of progress by looking inside countries and sectors

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### **Disclaimer**

The results presented in this report are outputs of the academic research conducted under the DDP BIICS project as per the contractual agreement. The academic work does not in any way represent our considered opinion for climate negotiations and also does not reflect the official policy or position of the Government of Europe.

# How is this document relevant to the Global Stocktake?

This document is part of a collective report that assesses the evolution of climate ambition in 26 countries and 3 hard-to-abate sectors through a granular and context-specific analysis of trends and progress of national and sectoral transformations.<sup>1</sup> This approach allows identifying what hinders and spurs action in countries and sectors, and understanding the conditions that can support enhanced ambition, which could be political, social, economic, governance.

These insights are directly relevant to four overarching functions of the Global Stocktake in support of its desired outcome, i.e. "to inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement, as well as enhancing international cooperation for climate action" (Article 14.3 of the Paris Agreement):

- Create the conditions for an open and constructive conversation on global cooperation (on e.g., technology, trade, finance, etc.), based on an in-depth understanding of the international enablers of enhanced country ambition.
- Organize a process for knowledge sharing and collective learning, based on concrete examples of actions already in place or being discussed, including best practices.
- Create space for open dialogues across different stakeholders to support better coordination of actions, based on a detailed understanding of the levers to be activated to enhance ambition in national and sectoral transitions
- Facilitate ownership by decision-makers of the climate challenge and the risks and opportunities of the low-emission and resilient transition, based on context-specific and granular analysis of barriers and enablers.

More specifically, the collective report in general – and this document in particular – can contribute to address some of the key guiding questions for the Global Stocktake<sup>2</sup>, notably:

- What actions have been taken to increase the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster the climate resilience of people, livelihoods, and ecosystem? To what extent have national adaptation plans and related efforts contributed to these actions (Decision 19/CMA.1, paragraph 36(c))?
- How adequate and effective are current adaptation efforts and support provided for adaptation (Article 7.14 (c) Paris Agreement)?

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<sup>1</sup> The full report « Climate ambition beyond emission numbers - Taking stock of progress by looking inside countries and sectors" can be found at: <https://www.iddri.org/en/publications-and-events/report/climate-ambition-beyond-emission-numbers-taking-stock-progress>

<sup>2</sup> Draft Guiding Questions for the Technical Assessment of GST1 (version 20th October 2021), available at: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Draft%20GST1\\_TA%20Guiding%20Questions.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Draft%20GST1_TA%20Guiding%20Questions.pdf)

- What are the barriers and challenges, including finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building gaps, faced by developing countries?
- What is the collective progress made towards achieving the long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing technology development and transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions referred in Article 10.1 of the Paris Agreement? What is the state of cooperative action on technology development and transfer?
- What progress has been made on enhancing the capacity of developing country Parties to implement the Paris Agreement (Article 11.3 Paris Agreement)?
- To achieve the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement (mitigation, adaptation, and finance flows and means of implementation, as well as loss and damage, response measures), in the light of equity and the best available science, taking into account the contextual matters in the preambular paragraphs of the Paris Agreement:
  - What are the good practices, barriers and challenges for enhanced action?
  - What is needed to make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development?
  - What are the needs of developing countries related to the ambitious implementation of the Paris Agreement?
  - What is needed to enhance national level action and support, as well as to enhance international cooperation for climate action, including in the short term?
  - What is the collective progress made by non-Party stakeholders, including indigenous peoples and local communities, to achieve the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, and what are the impacts, good practices, potential opportunities, barriers and challenges (Decision 19/CMA.1, paras 36(g) and 37(i))?

# Foreword

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Henri Waisman, Marta Torres Gunfaus, Anna Perez Catala, IDDRI.

Country commitments as reflected in enhanced Nationally Determined Contributions submitted to the UNFCCC are insufficient to put the world on track to achieve the collective objective of the Paris Agreement to hold temperature increase below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. Furthermore, concrete policies and actions adopted by countries on the ground are often not sufficient to achieve these NDC targets. These conclusions highlight the need to increase ambition and to provide convincing evidence to accelerate action in the immediate and short term to give effect to this ambition. Yet these assessments are not sufficient to effectively guide the progressive increase of ambition, as organized by the cyclical process of the Paris Agreement.

## APPROACH

With this imperative in mind, this report adopts a different, complementary, perspective on climate ambition. It seeks to open the box of emission pathways, by considering multiple dimensions of the conditions that will make these pathways possible. These are technical, economic, political, social and governance considerations in need of attention to enable the required far-reaching and systemic transformation towards the long-term goal. On the one hand, the revision of emission targets needs to be directed by an assessment of how drivers of emissions should change to trigger transformation. On the other hand, converting emissions' targets into pertinent concrete implementation requires well-designed policy packages and investment plans that are also informed by a clear and detailed understanding of the starting point, priorities and interplays between the available levers of transformation.

This bottom-up assessment aims at contributing to the process of collective learning in support of the progressive increase of collective ambition, as inserted at the core of the Paris Agreement paradigm. Approaching climate ambition through the lens of underlying transformations calls for reflecting the heterogeneous nature and the multi-faceted aspects


of transitions in different sectors and countries. This forces a move away from a purely global perspective and adopts a more granular approach based on country and individual sector perspectives. Thus, the report explores trends and progress on these transformations, as locally observed over the past years, notably since the Paris Agreement. This 'backwards looking' approach can help identify where developments are going in the right direction, where they should be accelerated and where major tensions remain that should be addressed as a priority to avoid undermining the transition. The picture of the state of the ambition discussion, firmly embedded in the country and sectoral realities, can provide means for reflection and action within the international climate community, particularly to inform focus areas for advancing the collective ambition agenda.

## STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

This country report describes the recent evolutions of domestic discourses on climate ambition, national climate policy, national governance and concrete policies and actions with a significant effect on GHG emissions. The chapter highlights a selection of striking and structurally important elements to advance the transformation towards carbon neutrality from an in-country perspective.

This report is part of a full series of 26 country chapters and three sectoral chapters. The full report includes a "summary for decision-makers" to present 10 cross-cutting messages emerging from the country and sector analysis, as a guide to the selection of priorities for collective action in the post-COP26 period.

You will find the full report at: [https://www.iddri.org/sites/default/files/PDF/Publications/Catalogue%20Iddri/Rapport/DDP\\_beyond%20emissions%20report.pdf](https://www.iddri.org/sites/default/files/PDF/Publications/Catalogue%20Iddri/Rapport/DDP_beyond%20emissions%20report.pdf)



## CLIMATE AMBITION

*This chapter has been written thanks to the support of the International Climate Initiative (IKI) of the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU).*

### ON DOMESTIC DISCOURSE

At this moment, a vast majority of Europeans (78%) perceives climate change as a *very serious problem*<sup>1</sup>. In the latest special Eurobarometer, *climate change* (18%) has been identified for the first time by European citizens as the single most serious problem facing the world, ahead of both (17%) *poverty, hunger, lack of drinking water* and the *spread of infectious diseases*. Doing so, despite the ongoing pandemic, highlights the **growing concern of European citizens regarding an issue that steadily ranked higher in terms of priority over the years following the Paris Agreement**<sup>2</sup>. However, conducting an analysis at national level reveals that there are still some important disparities between Member States. For instance, in some Northern countries, over a quarter of respondents are likely to mention climate change as the most serious problem whereas less than one in a ten respondents are likely to do so in Southeastern Europe. To address these divergences of opinion, Ursula von der Leyen presented on December 2019 a new growth strategy aiming to drive a just and inclusive transition for all while making Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050: the *European Green Deal*.

<sup>1</sup> [Eurobarometer \(europa.eu\)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurobarometer/eurobarometer).

<sup>2</sup> Climate change was ranked fourth in 2015, third in 2017 and second in 2019. However, the comparison with the 2021 results should be made with caution as three new answers items were introduced in the survey published in 2021.

The climate neutrality objective by 2050 was first mentioned by the European Commission in a communication released in November 2018<sup>3</sup>, following the IPCC report issued a month earlier. However, as the Juncker's Commission was entering the last effective months of its mandate, no regulatory initiative has been formally taken. For its part, a few months prior to the European election of May 2019, the European Parliament issued a resolution<sup>4</sup> endorsing it. Consequently, **the European election acted as a catalyst for the blooming of the Green Deal**. Due to its critical size, the *European Union* (49%)<sup>5</sup> was (and still is<sup>6</sup>) identified by its citizens, alongside *national governments* (55%) and *business and industry* (51%), as one of the main actors responsible for tackling climate change. Coinciding with the European voting, the occurrence of climate mobilizations played a major role and raised both the visibility and the stakes of the election. Following the example of Greta Thunberg, protests spread all over Europe, especially among the youngest generation. As a result, the overall turnout rose by 8 points to reach 50.66%. Within the younger generations, participation drastically increased: by 14 points for under 25 years old (42%) and by 12 points for the 25-39 category (47%). Additionally, behind *economy and growth*, *climate change* was acknowledged by respondents who took part in the ballot as their second reason for voting<sup>7</sup>, building up the *momentum* for Member States, the European institutions and the private sector to fully play their part.

In the wake of the Green Deal announcement, the European Council endorsed<sup>8</sup> a wording supporting climate neutrality. However, despite the climate emergency, the fact that the conclusions explicitly mentioned that "*One Member State could not commit to implement this objective at this stage*" illustrates the difficulty to reach a unanimous resolution (in this case, due to the Polish government's position). Among the other institutions, the European Investment Bank adopted a renewed Energy

Landing Policy in 2019 in order to phase out the financing of unabated fossil fuel energy projects as well as a Climate Roadmap to align all financing activities with the goals of the Paris Agreement. In addition, the European Central Bank pledged to factor climate change into its monetary policy strategy starting 2022. Indubitably, these announcements contributed to shake at least part of the decision-makers of the European business and industry sector, particularly among some major polluters too often protected by their national governments. As an illustration, five European oil and gas companies (Shell, Total, BP, Equinor, Repsol) have so far committed to be net-zero by 2050 (by all direct emissions) while none of their international counterparts did yet. However, the IEA recently reported<sup>9</sup>, that "Majors" oil companies (such as BP, Total or Shell) only account for 12.3% of the world reserves while National Oil Companies (Saudi Aramco, Rosneft, National Iranian Oil...) own 56%, highlighting the magnitude of the change required<sup>10</sup>. Moreover, as often, the devil is in the details. For instance, the net-zero pledges made by Shell, while applying to direct emissions (production, refining and processing fossil fuels), do not fully cover the emissions created by its consumers (scope 3). As for Total, the scope 3 is entirely covered but only for the use of its products across Europe, meaning that it is excluded from its worldwide operations. Similarly, BP's pledge regarding the scope 3 *de facto* only concerns 60% of its oil production. Moreover, none of the aforementioned companies has formerly given up the possibility of approving new extraction projects as they intend to rely on ambitious reforestation and carbon capture storage scenario rather than decreasing their emissions. Unfortunately, bad habits are always hard to break. According to estimates made by Reuters<sup>11</sup>, investments in renewables will remain way lower than those on fossil fuels for the 2021-2025 period whether it is for BP (\$30.6B vs. \$58.4B), Shell (\$15B vs. \$99.5B) or Total (\$12B vs. \$58B). Moreover, oil and gas companies also remain active behind the scene to safeguard their polluting

3 [EUR-Lex - 52018DC0773 - EN - EUR-Lex \(europa.eu\)](#)

4 [Texts adopted - Climate change - Thursday, 14 March 2019 \(europa.eu\)](#)

5 [Eurobarometer on climate change 2019](#) published one month prior to the European Parliament election.

6 In the 2021 climate change Eurobarometer, national governments (63%), business and industry (58%) and the EU (57%) remain the main actors perceived as responsible for tackling climate change.

7 [en-post-election-survey-2019-report.pdf \(europa.eu\)](#).

8 [European Council conclusions, 12 December 2019 \(europa.eu\)](#).

9 <https://www.iea.org/reports/the-oil-and-gas-industry-in-energy-transitions>

10 "Independents" such as Repsol and "International" Oil Companies like Equinor respectively accounting for 22% and 9.7%.

11 [Big Oil back to boom after pandemic bust, aiding climate push | Reuters](#)



business model. From January 2020 to May 2021, gas lobbyists held 323 meetings at governmental levels to ensure that gas will be acknowledged as a “transitional activity” under the European taxonomy regulation which is about 9.5% more than from the January 2018 to July 2020 period<sup>12</sup>. In addition, oil and gas companies are trying to loosen emission threshold required for hydrogen production to be qualified as “low carbon” by accepting either blending or carbon capture system. Not only would this delay the transition to green hydrogen<sup>13</sup>, but this would also allow oil companies not to devote their investments to renewables and energy efficiency and to continue their fossil fuels operations for a very long period. **Even though we can witness a better recognition of climate change and sustainability issues by the historical major polluters, the European Union will have to increase the regulatory pressure in order to deliver carbon neutrality through its fair Green Deal.**

## EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Formerly Vice-President in charge of Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights within the Juncker's Commission, Frans Timmermans is an experienced and well-established European politician. In that regard, he was appointed as **European Commission Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal in charge to deliver and implement the new sustainable and growth strategy**. In order of protocol, the Commissioner comes right after Ursula von der Leyen. The Vice-President for the European Green Deal thus coordinates the work of six other commissioners (Energy, Transport, Health and Food Safety, Environment, Oceans and Fisheries, Agriculture, Cohesion and Reforms) to ensure a cross-cutting approach regarding the proposals and reforms that need to be carried out in time such as the *European Climate Law*. Published on July 9 2021, **the European Climate**

**Law set up a reduction target of 55% of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 and enshrines the EU's binding objective of reaching climate neutrality by 2050.** To meet these objectives and ensure that everybody moves in the right direction the EU has set up several safeguards.

On one hand, a **European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change** will be created in order to provide independent scientific advice to help policymakers reach the climate goals and align EU policies accordingly. Annual reports will be issued by fifteen independent experts that will be appointed by the European Environmental Agency for a four year mandate. Monitoring the ongoing progress will also help complement the provisions of the 2018 Governance Regulation that requires EU Member States to develop medium (NECPs) and long-term planning instruments. In concrete terms, the expected update of the NECPs by the end of June 2024 will highly benefit, among other scientific data (IPCC's report released on 9 August 2021, State of the Energy Union...), from the latest recommendations of the newly created body.

On the other hand, to **enhance the participation of civil society and foster social acceptance**, the European Commission launched various initiatives such as the **Climate Pact**. As it intends to gather and connect people so that they can learn about climate change, share knowledge, and elaborate scale up solutions altogether, this initiative was severely impacted by the COVID pandemic. However, the Pact's ambition to discuss about greening transports, buildings or skills at local level should be an important tool to ensure that beyond the elections, citizens remain involved. At a higher level, the **Conference on the Future of Europe**<sup>14</sup> offers the possibility to either make or react to proposals on four main topics including climate change, environment and health. The results will be submitted afterwards to a panel of 200 randomly selected European citizens in charge of making political recommendations aimed at the institutions. However, the success of such an initiative will mainly depend on whether or not the European institutions take over the proposals and bring their ideas to life.

<sup>12</sup> [Out with Science, In with Lobbyists: Gas, Nuclear and the EU Taxonomy - Reclaim Finance](#)

<sup>13</sup> See In focus: Hydrogen – driving the green revolution | European Commission ([europea.eu](https://europea.eu)) that gives a definition of the different colours that are often linked with hydrogen.

<sup>14</sup> [BP\\_210616\\_ConferenceAvenirEurope\\_Verger-Couteau\\_EN.pdf \(institutdelors.eu\)](#)

Infringement procedures also play a crucial role, as Member States are sometimes late or even reluctant when it comes to implementing and applying EU law, especially when the chosen EU instrument is a directive. Therefore, the choice of the regulation directly applicable to all addressees without a transposition into national law should always be the preferred approach to ensure a level playing field. During the 2017-2020 period<sup>15</sup>, the European Commission opened 4.046 new infringement cases. A fifth of those were related to either environment (657<sup>16</sup>) or energy (252<sup>17</sup>). In 2020, out of the 1.786 cases that remained open, 444 were related to environment (highest number of any policy area) and 186 to energy. This trend is also reflected when we take a closer look at new delayed transposition cases (156 cases out of 599) or new EU pilot cases (49 out of 212) for the year 2020 where environment is again the main incriminated policy area. These important figures demonstrate that, despite ambitious domestic discourse, Member States are far from being faultless as they sometimes even choose to actively delay the implementation of EU climate policy. While progress has been made, law enforcement still is difficult within the EU. As it stands, 50 “green” breaches remained unresolved despite a ruling by the European Court of Justice. The permanence of this behavior from Member States may, in the long run, jeopardize the implementation of the Green Deal. The latter heavily relies on all sectors playing their role and on cooperation of all parts of the society.

**Now that carbon neutrality is legally binding, judges could become key players in the fight against climate change.** In that regard, civil society could also play a bigger role in the future thanks to the new agreement recently reached on the Aarhus Regulation widening the scope of decisions that can be brought into court for breaching environmental laws. Climate litigation directed towards national governments such as in Belgium, Germany or France or against private companies like in Netherlands could flourish. However, regarding the latter decision, the willingness expressed by Shell

to appeal the Dutch Court ruling on climate goals shows that private companies will use all the legal means to delay profound changes in their business model. Time remains money for them.

## ACTIONS AND POLICIES

On 14 July 2021, the Commission presented the *FitFor55*, a legislative package aiming at revising and updating the EU climate legislation to reduce EU GHG emissions by 55% by 2030. As all sectors will have to contribute, quantified targets were proposed to measure progress over time. This method was initially set up in 2007 with the 20-20-20 Package<sup>18</sup>. While following the same pattern, the **FitFor55 intends to draw conclusion from the 2020 package to design targets that better suits the possibilities offered by each sectoral regulation.**

Beyond initial expectations, EU27 GHG were reduced by 24% between 1990 and 2019<sup>19</sup>. Depicted as the cornerstone of the EU climate policy, the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) played a major role in that regard as actual emissions from stationary sources (power generation and industry) have declined by around 35% between 2005 and 2019<sup>20</sup> and even dropped by 9.1% between 2018 and 2019. Following regulatory reforms (such as the Market Stability Reserve in 2018) the EU carbon price of allowances increased in the last few years and recently started to become relevant enough to trigger change (€50/tCO<sub>2</sub> as of today)<sup>21</sup>. The ETS accelerated the phase-out of coal power plants that were replaced by renewables but also by natural gas power plants: since 2013, hard coal and lignite power emissions have fallen by 58% while gas power emissions increased by 23%<sup>22</sup>. In its current shape, the revamped ETS would have been able to deliver -51% emissions reduction in 2030. While the initial target was -43%, the *FitFor55* aims to raise it at a -61% by 2030. Even though some analysts argue that the carbon price could be at €100/tCO<sub>2</sub> by 2030, the

<sup>15</sup> [2020-annual-report-eulaw\\_en.pdf \(europa.eu\)](#)

<sup>16</sup> 369 were related to non-communication, 259 to non-conformity/incorrect application and 29 to regulations, treaties, decisions.

<sup>17</sup> 125 were related to non-communication, 99 to non-conformity/incorrect application and 28 to regulations, treaties, decisions.

<sup>18</sup> By 2020, cut GHG from 1990 by 20%, have 20% of EU energy coming from renewable and 20% improvement in energy efficiency.

<sup>19</sup> [Progress made in cutting emissions | Climate Action \(europa.eu\)](#)

<sup>20</sup> 2021 ETS Impact Assessment.

<sup>21</sup> [JDI-E3G-paper\\_innovation-in-the-ETS\\_final.pdf \(institutdelors.eu\)](#) see figure 2 p.4.

<sup>22</sup> [Gas power plants overtook lignite in 2020 to become Europe's #1 power sector emitter - Ember \(ember-climate.org\)](#)

Commission adopts a more conservative hypothesis with a price per t/CO<sub>2</sub> being between €45–€70 from 2026 to 2030 and between €50–€85 in 2030. Such a scenario implies that the Commission expects the shift from coal to gas to carry on at the actual pace while relying on other sectors to take over to reduce emissions by the additional 10%. The inclusion of the maritime sector is more than welcome (it emits around 4% of all EU CO<sub>2</sub> emissions), but creating an adjacent ETS to the heating and the transport sectors appears to bring little added value. It would indeed require a higher carbon price (more than €100/tCO<sub>2</sub>) to drive changes while having little impact on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reduction. Finally, given the revised objectives, industry will have to take a greater share of the collective burden. It is worrying that industrial emissions have stagnated and only dropped by 1% between 2012 and 2018<sup>23</sup>. As the price is expected to grow, the carbon border adjustment mechanism will help prevent the risk of carbon leakage. However, as it stands, the current proposal gives too much room for maneuver to industry through free allocation of emissions allowances<sup>24</sup> as their phasing out will only start in 2025 and ends in 2036. Negotiation will have to focus on ending free allocation earlier since 90% of industrial carbon pollution currently does not carry any cost for the polluting companies<sup>25</sup> while the remaining costs were passed onto consumers.

Electricity demand in the EU is now close to pre COVID levels and part of the power generation coming from fossil fuels has been replaced by renewables<sup>26</sup>, resulting in emissions being 12% lower. In the medium to long term, ETS price will help deploy renewable electricity sources<sup>27</sup>. Given that the EU barely achieved the 20% renewable target in 2020, the FitFor55 proposed several sectoral binding targets such as in heating and cooling (an annual 1.1% increase for Member States) or in the transport sector. **However, the EC did not pursue its logic up to the end by not committing to binding targets at national level,**

**which could hinder the RES deployment in some Member States that are either reluctant or lack financial capacity.**

Defined within the Governance Regulation that entered into force in December 2018<sup>28</sup>, the energy efficiency first principle is the cheapest way to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. As it was not made binding for Member States at the time, the 20% target, was not met by 2020<sup>29</sup> which should have acted as a stronger warning for the EC. Modeling scenario from the Commission shows that a 3% gap should be expected regarding the 32.5% energy efficiency target by 2030. To address that gap the FitFor55 not only reviewed to -39% the primary energy consumption and to -36% the final energy consumption but also required countries to establish measures to cut their final energy consumption by 1.5% every year starting 2024. Paradoxically and sadly, Member States had been more willing in 2007 than in 2020 regarding national binding targets. **Member States might have to step up on that file and take responsibility if they want to maintain the Green Deal's credibility.** Hence, in spite of the checks made by the Commission within the Governance Regulation, there remain many disparities between Member States' respective NECPs<sup>30</sup> commitments. Relying on the goodwill of the Member States will not be a recipe for success. This could just call for more judiciary interventions at national level as now witnessed.

**Unfortunately, Member States see too often the EU as a provider of public funding for the transition.** The more binding the EU objectives are, the more the EU should provide the money. Many financial instruments have been set up in the last decade, more and more oriented towards the climate objectives such as the Funds dedicated to the Just Transition, the Innovation or Modernization of infrastructures whose endowment will be increased. This is a slow process as the projects to be financed are not spontaneously climate compliant. To initiate a complete paradigm shift, the EU also established minimum thresholds that must be allocated towards the fight against climate change such as within the NextGenerationEU budget (30%), or the Recovery

<sup>23</sup> [The EU Emission Trading System – carbon pricing as an important tool to achieve the objectives of the Green Deal - Carbon Market Watch](#)

<sup>24</sup> [Official Journal C 302/2021 \(europa.eu\)](#)

<sup>25</sup> [The EU Emission Trading System – carbon pricing as an important tool to achieve the objectives of the Green Deal - Carbon Market Watch](#)

<sup>26</sup> [European Electricity Review: H1-2021 - Ember \(ember-climate.org\)](#)

<sup>27</sup> [European Union 2020 – Analysis - IEA, p.292.](#)

<sup>28</sup> [EUR-Lex - 32018R1999 - EN - EUR-Lex \(europa.eu\)](#)

<sup>29</sup> Only 9 MS were on track in 2019 to meet the 20% target.

<sup>30</sup> [NECP Tracker reveals: the EU needs better plans to implement the enhanced climate and energy targets – UNIFY \(caneurope.org\)](#)

and Resilience Facility (37%). The EC also proposed the creation of a Social Climate Fund to support the transition for vulnerable households to ensure a fair transition.

Finally, talking about credibility also implies to avoid *greenwashing*. In that regard, the taxonomy regulation that aims to define what belongs to the “green investment” category should also be mentioned as the accelerator of the European transition as it will allow to earmark private investments towards cleaner products. Unfortunately, lobbying from business circles and some Member States may hinder the effectiveness of a proposal that could, on paper, be a game changer.

**Short termism and fossil fuels vested interests remain the main obstacles to the completion of the European Green Deal objectives.**



## DDP

The DDP is an initiative of the Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI). It aims to demonstrate how countries can transform their economies by 2050 to achieve global net zero emissions and national development priorities, consistently with the Paris Agreement.. The DDP initiative is a collaboration of leading research teams currently covering 36 countries. It originated as the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP), which analysed the deep decarbonization of energy systems in 16 countries prior to COP21 ([deepdecarbonization.org](http://deepdecarbonization.org)). Analyses are carried out at the national scale, by national research teams. These analyses adopt a long-term time horizon to 2050 to reveal the necessary short-term conditions and actions to reach carbon neutrality in national contexts. They help governments and non-state actors make choices and contribute to in-country expertise and international scientific knowledge. The aim is to help governments and non-state actors make choices that put economies and societies on track to reach a carbon neutral world by the second half of the century. Finally, national research teams openly share their methods, modelling tools, data and the results of their analyses to share knowledge between partners in a very collaborative manner and to facilitate engagement with sectoral experts and decision-makers.

[www.ddpinitiative.org](http://www.ddpinitiative.org)

## IDDRI

The Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI) is an independent, not-for-profit policy research institute based in Paris. Its objective is to identify the conditions and propose tools to put sustainable development at the heart of international relations and public and private policies. IDDRI is also a multi-stakeholder dialogue platform and supports stakeholders in global governance debates on the major issues of common interest, such as actions to mitigate climate change, protect biodiversity, strengthen food security, and to manage urbanisation. The institute also participates in work to build development trajectories that are compatible with national priorities and the sustainable development goals.

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